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Abstract
This paper develops a rich decision theoretic dynamic ¯rm model that analyzes pro-
ductivity and interest rate shocks. The model is used to analyze the cyclical dynamics
of ¯xed and inventory investment and in particular asks whether constraints to the
°ow of funds can generate the frequently overlooked fact that investment in input in-
ventories leads investment in ¯xed capital in business cycle frequencies. To account for
this regularity the model proposes a combination of irreversibility and ¯nancing con-
straints. The usefulness of this explanation in relation to competing hypotheses, relies
on the fact that it is also consistent with a list of facts from the inventory research. In
addition it is shown that under persistent shocks, ¯nancing constraints are su±cient
but not necessary to explain procyclicality. This implies that ¯xed investment cash
°ow regressions may not be informative for the presence of capital market imperfec-
tions because positive correlations can arise even under perfect capital markets. Last,
analysis of interest rate shocks implies that the e®ects on inventory spending are quite
small in relation to e®ects arising from productivity shocks.
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It is a well known fact that inventory investment is procyclical. This is one of the two key stylized
facts stressed in the survey of inventory research by Ramey and West (1999). Moreover, manu-
facturers' materials and supplies are one of the largest and most volatile components of inventory
investment, as documented in many studies. Blinder and Maccini (1991) argue that much of the
cyclical °uctuation in manufacturing inventories is due to raw materials and work-in-progress as
opposed to ¯nished goods. In motivating their study Humphreys et al. (2001) document that invest-
ment in input inventories is more than three times more variable than investment in ¯nished good
inventories. Further, as documented by the same authors, the cyclical behavior of input inventory
investment is a consequence of the volatility and procyclicality of materials deliveries in relation
to materials usage. An interesting yet overlooked fact is that investment in input inventories leads
investment in ¯xed capital in both aggregate and manufacturing U.S. data.1 Bernanke and Gertler
(1995) indirectly document this timing di®erence in their survey of results for the \credit channel"
view of the monetary policy transmission mechanism by showing ¯xed investment lags behind other
types of spending following a monetary policy shock. The purpose of this paper is to propose an
explanation for this fact while being consistent with a number of facts from the inventory research.
Our model has the following three features: a realistic time-to-build assumption in the produc-
tion of ¯xed capital, irreversibility of ¯xed investment and ¯nancing constraints. Clearly one could
rationalize the timing di®erence between investment and other spending by appealing to gestation
lags (time-to-build) for ¯xed capital. The problem with this explanation is two-fold. First, it would
require an assumption on the length of the gestation lag for ¯xed capital that is not supported by
the existing empirical evidence.2 Second, and more importantly, a pure time-to-build argument
does not pass the inventory stylized fact list and in particular it fails to generate procyclicality of
inventory investment.
The model outlined in this paper can account for the dynamic correlations between investment in
¯xed capital and inventories while being consistent with the stylized inventory facts as documented
in Humphreys et al. (2001) and recently analyzed by Caggese (2007). It is important to stress that
the role of ¯nancing constraints is very important for the model's ability to match the empirical
dynamic correlations. Intuitively, because investment in ¯xed capital is irreversible, an adverse
productivity shock causes only a limited decline in investment compared to optimal. This implies
that ¯xed capital is higher than the level implied by lower productivity. At the same time, the
1Moreover the same fact holds for U.K. data.
2In addition as Bernanke and Gertler (1995) emphasize equipment investment, which will be characterized
by shorter lags, accounts for nearly all of the decline in investment following a policy shock.
1presence of ¯nancing constraints implies that internal liquidity is valuable. Given that the level of
the capital stock is high compared to the optimal, this incentives the ¯rm to persistently spend
less on capital projects in order to economize on liquidity, giving rise to a hump-shaped response
of ¯xed investment. Thus irreversibility of ¯xed investment is crucial for this result and without
it, capital would move in line with productivity and ¯xed investment would respond more sharply
(in order to adjust a slowly depreciating capital stock).
The paper analyzes a rich-decision theoretic model that encompasses both productivity and
interest rate shocks. The analysis presented here complements the work of Maccini et al. (2004) on
the relationship between variation in interest rates and inventories in the long run by analyzing the
dynamics of input inventories in response to real interest rate variation in the short run. This is
important because the analysis provides a natural link to the monetary policy transmission mecha-
nism question from the perspective of inventory spending. Monetary policy exerts its in°uence on
aggregate demand by controlling a short-term interest rate, therefore the ¯rst step in understanding
the transmission mechanism is to develop a foundation that allows to study the e®ects of interest
rate changes. The simulations of the model imply that quantitatively the e®ect of interest rate
variation is quite small compared to productivity disturbances. This ¯nding is consistent with the
empirical evidence presented in Maccini et al. (2004).
Finally, the paper shows that procyclicality in materials deliveries and ¯xed investment does
not necessarily imply ¯nancing constraints. Under persistent shocks and irreversibility of ¯xed
investment procyclicality arises even with perfect capital markets. In the simulations presented un-
der irreversibility and perfect capital markets, ¯xed investment and cash-°ow are nearly perfectly
correlated. This implies that empirical work that relies on the cash-°ow|¯xed investment rela-
tionship in reduced form regressions are not necessarily informative about the presence of capital
market imperfections. This ¯nding is related to Gomez (2001) who shows that reduced form ¯xed
investment equations that include cash-°ow as an explanatory variable will be likely mis-speci¯ed,
and will incorrectly assign a role to cash-°ow. Although the reasons in Gomez (2001) are quite
di®erent, namely speci¯cation and measurement errors, the prediction is the same.
This paper is mostly related to Caggese (2007), which focuses on the procyclicality of materials
deliveries and inventory investment and their asymmetric behavior over the business cycle, relying
on a similar modelling approach.3 This paper provides additional insights by focusing on the aspect
of timing of ¯xed and inventory investment, the validity of ¯xed investment cash °ow correlations
for the signi¯cance of capital market imperfections, and an analysis of interest rate shocks while
3Holt (2003) is another paper that examines the implications of both ¯nancing and irreversibility con-
straints but instead focuses on dividend policies of ¯rms along their life-cycle.
2con¯rming the ¯ndings in the earlier paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 discusses
the solution and calibration. In Section 4 results from the simulated version of the model are
presented. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
The model analyzed incorporates the joint decisions of ¯rms in ¯xed and inventory investment in
the presence of ¯nancial constraints. The following subsections explain the components that are
essential to the framework.
2.1 Firms
2.1.1 Technology
There is an entrepreneurial sector which is populated by a continuum of risk-neutral in¯nitely-lived
¯rms. Firm j produces output, using the following decreasing returns to scale Cobb-Douglas tech-
nology:4




t ° + ® + º < 1
where At is an idiosyncratic productivity shock, Kt is capital, Mt is the stock of materials, and Lt
is the labor input. Following empirical work by Ramey (1989) and more recently Humphreys et al.
(2001), Mt can be thought as input materials and/or work-in-process. Additions to the capital stock
is subject to gestation lags. Speci¯cally, I assume a 2-period time-to-build for new capital projects.
The time-to-build requirement implies that in any given period t, ¯rms initiate new projects, s2t,
and complete partially ¯nished projects, s1t. This assumption intends to capture the design and
construction stages that exist in undertaking investment projects in plant and equipment. The
time-to-build feature of capital projects is emphasized by Kydland and Prescott (1982). Formally:
s2t = s1;t+1 (2.1)
Kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)Kt + s1t (2.2)
It = '1s1t + '2s2t; '1 + '2 = 1 (2.3)
4Decreasing returns to scale are necessary for ¯rm size to be well de¯ned. Otherwise ¯rm size is indeter-
minate and the entrepreneurial sector reduces to just a single producer.
3where s2t denotes new projects at time t, s1t denotes projects initiated at time t ¡ 1, ± is the
depreciation rate of the capital stock, and It denotes total investment expenditures at time t. The
parameters '1 and '2 represent the fraction of resources allocated to projects that are 1 and 2
periods away from completion respectively.5
In addition the ¯rm places materials orders dt, for use in production in period t+1, Mt+1. The
stock of materials thus evolves according to:
Mt+1 = (1 ¡ ±m)Mt + dt (2.4)
Note that this timing convention assumes that orders of materials at time t enter the ¯rm after
current production has taken place.
Last, ¯rms hire labor from a competitive market at a given (constant) wage rate, w.
2.1.2 Financing
Firms face ¯nancing constraints in making their investment|in ¯xed capital and inventories|and
employment decisions. Speci¯cally, the °ow of funds into the ¯rm is restricted in the following
ways. Firms in this industry are not allowed to issue fresh equity, implying that dividends must be
non-negative.
divt ¸ 0 (2.5)
Firms can borrow to ¯nance expenditures subject to an exogenous limit (BLim). The credit mar-
ket is assumed to extend one-period (secured) debt only. A limited enforceability argument (see
Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (1997)) can justify this exogenous limit.
Bt+1(1 + rt+1) 6 BLim (2.6)
In the calibration exercise I assume that this limit is equal to the value of collateralizable
(productive) assets a ¯rm can pledge. This is the sum of un-depreciated capital and materials
evaluated at the steady state of the model, (1¡±m)M +(1¡±)K.6 Replacing in (2.6) above gives:
(1 ¡ ±m)M + (1 ¡ ±)K
(1 + rt+1)
> Bt+1 (2.7)
Thus e®ectively the borrowing limit varies with the interest rate, i.e., a higher interest rate is
associated with a smaller borrowing capacity.
5Note that the technological assumptions on projects do not leave ¯rms the option to abandon projects
in the second period of the construction.
6A bar above a variable denotes the steady state value.
4Moreover in order to rule out any other external sources of funds the following constraints must
be satis¯ed.
dt ¸ 0 (2.8)
s2t ¸ 0 (2.9)
Note that the last two inequalities imply that ¯rms cannot ¯nance expenditures by either
selling materials or their capital stock. In particular the last inequality along with the techno-
logical assumption on capital projects above e®ectively makes investment decisions irreversible.
Irreversibility can be motivated by the fact that existing production facilities often have very low
resale values. The importance and relevance of irreversibility has been highlighted by Bertola and
Caballero (1994) and Caballero et al. (1995). Taken together, these nonnegativity constraints pro-
hibit the ¯rm from using any source of funds other than internally generated funds and to a limited
extent new borrowing.
2.1.3 The ¯rm's problem
Timing is as follows. At the beginning of period t, the idiosyncratic productivity shock At, and rt
are realized. The ¯rm inherits a stock of capital Kt, materials Mt, half-completed projects s1t, and
debt Bt, from the previous period. Then, before At+1 and rt+1 are observed, the ¯rm decides how
to allocate internal funds (cash °ow) at time t, and new borrowing, Bt+1, to ¯nance the wage bill,
expenditure on new and existing projects s2t;s1t, materials orders, dt, dividends, divt, and repay














lnAt+1 = ½AlnAt + ¾A"t+1 "t » N(0;1)
lnrt+1 = (1 ¡ ½r)lnr + ½rlnrt + ¾rÀt+1 Àt » N(0;1)
Note that by the equality of sources and uses of funds, dividends are:





t ¡ wLt ¡ dt ¡ '1s1t ¡ '2s2t + Bt+1 ¡ (1 + rt)Bt (2.11)
From equation (2.11) above one can see that the ¯rm ¯nances expenditures, distributes divi-






t )º ¡ rtBt) (2.12)
The ¯rm's problem de¯ned above can be described in six state variables (K;M;s1;B;A;r).
An additional complexity is the presence of both equality and inequality constraints. While the
presence of inequality constraints alone do not pose a problem for obtaining a solution based on a
global approach (e.g. policy or value function iteration), the fact of the high dimensionality (six
state variables) renders such solution methods infeasible for a reasonably accurate characterization
of the solution (curse of dimensionality). To circumvent this di±culty a second order perturbation
method is used and adapted to permit the accommodation of the inequality constraints in a modi¯ed
objective function. This way the problem is recast into one with equality constraints and the
approximate solution is found using a second order Taylor expansion of the equilibrium conditions.
More speci¯cally, the original problem is modi¯ed by parametrically incorporating the inequality
constraints into the objective function. This is accomplished by modifying the objective function
with penalty terms that become larger as the respective constraint approaches its limit.8 De¯ne
pi, i = 1;2;3;4 as the parameter that controls the tightness of constraint i. The period objective
at time t is modi¯ed to incorporate the inequality constraints as:
divt + p1[divlog(divt) ¡ divt]+






¡ Bt+1) + Bt+1] + p4[dlog(dt) ¡ dt]
where a bar over a variable denotes its steady state value. For example, the inequality constraint
on dividends is accounted for by the term p1[divlog(divt) ¡ divt]. Using this formulation the ¯rm
incurs an increasing penalty as dividends are reduced and approach the no issuance constraint. In
the limit as divt ! 0 this term diverges to ¡1. The parameter p1 controls the weight on the
penalty. Hence, the functional form of these terms implies that choices approaching the limit of
the constraint will hardly be chosen.9 The speci¯c way these terms enter the period t dividend
ensures that the non-stochastic steady state is independent of the parameters pi. In other words
the steady state of this model corresponds to a frictionless (perfect capital markets) equilibrium.
8This is an example of the logarithmic barrier method for constrained optimization problems. See Boyd
and Vandenberghe (2004) for details of this approach.
9For a similar (barrier) approach in a di®erent context see Kim et al. (2005).



















¡ Bt+1) + Bt+1] + p4[dlog(dt) ¡ dt]+
¸t(Kt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±)Kt ¡ s2t¡1) + ¹t(Mt+1 ¡ (1 ¡ ±m)Mt ¡ dt)g
¾
(2.13)
where ¸t;¹t denote the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with the equality constraints. The
¯rst order necessary conditions for this problem are given in the Appendix.
3 Solution
The solution of the model is characterized by a set of Euler equations along with the Kuhn-
Tucker conditions for the equality constraints and the given initial values for the state variables.
An approximate solution is calculated by using a second order perturbation method around the
non-stochastic steady state of the model. The second order Taylor approximation, as described in
Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004), is adapted to accommodate the inequality constraints as explained
in section 2.1.3 above.10
Perturbation methods, in contrast to global methods such as value/policy function iteration, can
easily handle high dimensional state problems like the one described in this paper. The innovation
is to tackle the inequality constraints within this approach, and recently some progress has been
made on that front (see Kim et al. (2005) that analyze a consumption-asset allocation problem
using a similar approach).
3.1 Calibration
In order to analyze the equilibrium of the model and gain intuition on the dynamics the equilibrium
conditions of the model are simulated using a baseline set of parameter values as in Table 1. These
are discussed below.
The value for the output share of materials, °, and labor, º is taken from the manufacturing
plant level study of Sakellaris and Wilson (2004). Basu and Fernald (1997) estimates of the returns
to scale in manufacturing suggest a value close to one. The overall returns to scale is set equal
to 0.90. This choice pins down the value for the capital share, ®. There is scattered evidence for
gestation/delivery lags for capital projects. Abel and Blanchard (1986) document delivery lags for
10The Appendix derives the non-stochastic steady state point around which the approximation is taken,
and outlines the essential computational details of the solution.
7fabricated metal, non-electrical machinery, and electrical machinery between two to three quarters,
while Mayer and Sonenblum (1955) report that the average time across industries needed to equip
plants with new machinery is 2.7 quarters. The seminal paper of Kydland and Prescott (1982)
utilizes a four quarters time to build assumption with equal cost distribution. A a two period lead
time is chosen for investment projects both to simplify the model and the fact that equipment
investment, which would be characterized by smaller lags, dominates structures investment in
manufacturing. Recently, Zhou (2000) ¯nds that an equal distribution of cost for time-to-build
investment produces the best ¯t for aggregate investment data. Accordingly f'1;'2g = f0:5;0:5g.11
The real interest rate process is calibrated to match the 3-month U.S. T-bill rate less consumer
price in°ation with an AR(1) process over the period 1947Q1 to 2006Q2. Accordingly the (steady
state) subjective discount factor, ¯, is chosen to match the average real interest rate over the same
period. The depreciation rate for materials is calculated in order to match the average (annual)
aggregate (materials inventories/usage) ratio.12 Capital depreciates by 2:5% a quarter. To calibrate
the process for the idiosyncratic productivity shock the paper follows Gomez (2001) and Caggese
(2007) and uses the values for ½A and ¾A provided therein. Hall and Hall (1993) report the ratio
of debt to total assets in a panel of U.S. manufacturing ¯rms around 0.25. This determines steady
state debt, B. The values for the parameters that control the tightness of constraints, p0
is are
chosen to minimize Euler equation errors according to the computational procedure described in
the Appendix. Finally, all relative prices are assumed (including the constant real wage) equal to
one.
4 Results
In this section, results are presented from the calibrated version of the model. The analysis begins
with the special case of i:i:d: shocks to gain intuition for the e®ects of ¯nancing constraints on the
dynamics of the model. The more general case is then considered with autocorrelated shocks. In
both cases the results are compared to what the model would predict in the frictionless environment,
which is referred to as the perfect capital markets (PCM) version. Simulated data using the
calibrated processes for the productivity and interest rate shocks generates 151 time periods, the
length of the data available, repeated 1000 times. Using the simulated data contemporaneous and
dynamic correlations of investment (¯xed and inventories) are calculated and compared with their
11Koeva (2001) provides evidence of time-to-build and irreversibilities in ¯rm level (including manufactur-
ing) plant investment.
12The data for this calculation are taken from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers and the
NBER manufacturing productivity database. ±m is calculated from the restriction
(1¡±m)Mt
±mMt =
materials inventories at end yeart
usage of materials in yeart . In the data (1962-2000) the ratio is roughly equal to one.
8empirical counterparts.
4.1 Impulse response functions
4.1.1 The case of i.i.d shocks
To better understand the e®ects of ¯nancing constraints on the dynamics of the model the resulting
dynamic responses are compared to the ones obtained in the case of perfect capital markets (PCM)
in the case of i:i:d shocks. This is the cleanest case to analyze as it will highlight the e®ects
of constraints relative to the frictionless equilibrium on the dynamics.13 Figure 1 plots impulse
responses (in log deviations from the non-stochastic steady state) following a negative unit standard
deviation i:i:d productivity shock. The shock takes place in period 1 and since it is i:i:d over time
it is expected to return to normal in period 2. Notice that in the perfect capital markets case,
as productivity is expected to return to its mean value next period, the ¯rm's optimal response
is to entirely absorb the shock in reduced cash °ow and dividends, and employ less labor as it
has become less productive at the time of the shock. With an i:i:d productivity shock the optimal
capital and materials stock do not change over time. Labor of course adjusts as it has an immediate
impact on production, in contrast to capital and materials. Hence, absent any constraints on the
°ow of funds, the ¯rm does not deviate from the optimal amount of factor use, and consequently
investment in materials and ¯xed capital is equal to zero. When constraints on the °ow of funds
inside the ¯rm are in place the responses change signi¯cantly.
First observe that when the deviation in dividends is penalized, it is no longer optimal to
entirely absorb the adverse shock in the latter. The fact that dividends begin to decline towards
the no equity issuance limit implies a loss in terms of ¯rm value; as a result the ¯rm is reluctant
to let dividends fall, and uses the remaining margins of adjustment in order to absorb the adverse
productivity shock. These margins include project starts, s2t, deliveries of materials, dt, and debt,
Bt+1. As Figure 1 shows it uses all of these margins: it reduces materials orders (deliveries), new
capital projects, and increases borrowing. The fact that the constraints on the °ow of funds become
active means that the ¯rm trades o® the savings in terms of dividends by cutting expenditure (and
taking on more debt) today versus the future. The expected (discounted) cost of those actions,
since the former actions imply a loss of future dividends (by reducing capital and materials and
hence production in the future periods, as well as increasing the future debt burden) makes the
tradeo® worthwhile. Also note that labor adjustment is identical as in the frictionless case; in e®ect
the constraints hardly a®ect this choice since the e®ects on capital and materials stock are quite
13The model nests the perfect capital markets case; the latter can be analyzed by setting all penalty
parameters equal to zero.
9small. Quantitatively, debt adjustment dominates so the ¯rm alters factor use very little. 14
Figure 2 plots impulse response functions in the case of an i:i:d real interest rate shock. Note
that in this case the dynamic responses of all variables are very similar to Figure 1 with the
exception of labor. However, quantitatively the scale of the e®ect on the variables' responses is
orders of magnitude smaller than in the case of productivity shocks. The implications of this point
are discussed below, but is worth pointing out that the reason is that an interest rate shock has
a very small e®ect on ¯rms' dividends compared to the e®ect arising from a productivity shock.
Evaluated at the steady state (impact e®ect on dividends), the coe±cient on the interest rate equals
( 1
¯ ¡ 1)B = 0:0082, compared to K
®M
°L
º = 0:16 for productivity.15
4.1.2 The case of persistent shocks
Examining the dynamic responses in the case of persistent productivity and interest rate shocks
demonstrates that persistent shocks alone can produce similar dynamics with or without con-
straints. Taking the case of productivity shocks, Figure 3 plots the dynamic responses, under the
PCM case and constrained versions of the model for the baseline penalty parameters (Table 1).16
The most noticeable di®erence in the dynamic responses is on new project starts, s2t, debt, Bt+1,
dividends, divt, and the capital stock, Kt+1.17 Restricting attention to new starts, observe that in
the constrained version of the model the response|due to irreversibility|is orders of magnitude
smaller relative to the PCM, where the ¯rm is able to freely reduce the capital stock to its new
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= 0:39, in the constrained version).
An additional di®erence arises in the dynamic response of debt, which can be illustrated with
the aid of Figure 4. Relative to Figure 3, Figure 4 adds the responses with the irreversibility
14Debt responds nearly one-for-one with the productivity shock, i.e. 0.90 of the change in the productivity
shock.
15Note that in the constrained version the ¯rm hires less labor as the constraints imply that capital and
materials will be lower in the future, making labor less productive. Also note that in this case labor does
not respond contemporaneously, but only with lag (that is after the materials stock has been reduced in
the period following the shock), and more interestingly the response is quite persistence compared to Figure
1. This latter property owes to the persistence of the capital and materials stock which remain below the
frictionless level for many periods. Thus, in the interest rate i:i:d case, labor becomes sensitive to ¯nancing
constraints indirectly through the e®ect of these constraints on the productive assets of the ¯rm.
16Beginning with this case ¯xed investment plots are presented, de¯ned as in equation, (2.3).
17Also note that in the constrained version, because capital is ine±ciently high, factor use (materials and
labor) is also higher relative to the PCM version, since the higher capital stock raises the respective marginal
products.
10constraint on new projects turned o® (p2 = 0). The most noticeable change is on the dynamic
response of new starts, which absent the constraint can now be freely adjusted to allow the capital
stock to reach the new (lower) optimum (notice that it nearly traces the response under PCM). The
dynamic responses for the rest of the variables are very similar. This implies that the irreversibility
constraint on new capital projects is largely responsible for the di®erences in dynamics, especially
for the relative volatility of ¯xed and inventory investment. There is quite a noticeable di®erence in
the response of debt. When there is no constraint on s2t, borrowing initially declines signi¯cantly
more compared to the baseline version (with all constraints active). Thus there is a trade o® between
adjusting debt and adjusting new project starts. When p2 = 0, new starts decline freely in order
to reduce the capital stock towards its new optimal (lower) value, and the ¯rm reduces borrowing
signi¯cantly in order to boost dividends in the next few future periods. The fact that the negative
shock will persist and that materials and capital will be lower in the future (as a result of lower
productivity) implies less income generated by production, and hence a decline in dividends which
is costly since the constraint on dividends is active. The ¯rm responds by reducing borrowing as this
will reduce the future debt burden. But with the constraint on s2t active the capital stock declines
signi¯cantly less (as well as materials) which implies that the future loss in terms of dividends will
be smaller, hence the incentive to cut borrowing today is reduced. Borrowing then reverses course
and rises above the steady state as the ¯rm wants to restore dividends to normal in later periods.
As the productivity shock dissipates over time, capital, materials and labor rise towards the steady
state values implying a higher production rate. But with the expenditure on deliveries and all
projects recovered in the next few periods after the shock, dividends decline and borrowing then
rises to boost current dividends in those later periods.
Figure 5 plots the dynamic responses with all but the irreversibility constraint shut o®. By
and large the most striking ¯nding is the fact that compared to the PCM version there are hardly
any di®erences in real variables' dynamics. An important implication is that under persistent
productivity shocks it is impossible to infer whether data on ¯xed investment are generated from the
fully constrained version or the irreversible version of the model. This has important implications
for empirical studies that attempt to detect capital market imperfections using ¯xed investment-
cash °ow regressions. In section 4.2 simulated data show that one will obtain nearly identical
(positive) correlations from both versions of the model. This implies that in ¯xed investment
(empirical) regressions a positive correlation with cash °ow cannot be interpreted as evidence of
capital market imperfections.
Finally, Figure 6 plots the dynamic responses in the case of a persistent (adverse) real interest
rate shock. In the PCM version interest rate variation a®ects the cost of debt as well as the return
11on ¯xed and inventory investment: a higher real interest rate implies that a unit of investment
either in capital or inventories has a lower future return in terms of dividends. In other words the
return to saving money (rather than investing inside the ¯rm) has increased. This calls for lower
investment in capital and inventories and as the productive assets of the ¯rm decline leads the ¯rm
to hire less labor.18 The rise in the interest rate reduces current dividends and cash °ow. The
persistence of the shock implies that the future burden of any given debt load will be higher and
will persist. Thus the ¯rm reduces debt.
However, the e®ects compared to the productivity impulse are quantitatively small (compare
the scales in Figures 3 and 6). Thus this analysis implies that pure interest rate variation is unable
to produce the large impact e®ects of monetary policy on inventory investment as documented,
for example in Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) or Bernanke and Gertler (1995). This ¯nding is also
consistent with the analysis in Maccini et al. (2004) on the lack of a signi¯cant short run e®ect of
the real interest rate on inventory investment.
Comparing the dynamic responses under persistent interest rate and productivity shocks es-
tablishes the claim in the introduction of the paper that under either type of shock procyclical
materials deliveries and ¯xed investment do not necessarily imply ¯nancing constraints. Persis-
tent shocks under PCM (with the irreversibility constraint alone) can give rise to procyclical ¯xed
investment and materials deliveries. Thus, a researcher who is attempting to detect the presence
of ¯nancing constraints needs to carefully condition any statement derived from cash-°ow ¯xed
investment correlations.
4.2 Second moments
Empirical studies that emphasize the role of capital market imperfections in explaining the cyclical
behavior of inventories and ¯xed investment utilize panels of ¯rms and typically regress inventory
(¯xed) investment to variables that proxy for these type of frictions. For example in Fazzari et al.
(1988) or Carpenter et al. (1994) cash °ow is the explanatory variable that aims to capture the im-
pact of ¯nancing constraints in ¯xed investment and inventory investment regressions respectively;
these authors demonstrate the signi¯cance of cash °ow in explaining (¯xed) inventory investment
for a group of ¯rms with imperfect access to capital markets. This section discusses the results
obtained from the simulated model, concerning the validity of the conclusions from these studies.
After simulating the model for persistent productivity (interest rate) shocks the problems that can
18As discussed in the previous section, the e®ect of the constraints on labor arise not because the ¯rm ¯nds
it optimal to cut labor in order to save on internal funds but rather as a result of maintaining the optimal
input mix (setting the marginal product of labor equal to the wage rate). Since capital and materials are
declining so will labor to maintain the equality.
12arise in interpreting cash-°ow correlations are clear.
The calibrated version of the model is used to generate time series with 151 periods repeated
1000 times.19 This model can replicate ¯rm histories with various degrees of ¯nancing constraints
by adjusting the weight on the borrowing or equity constraint.
Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 report contemporaneous correlations and illustrate several interesting
results. First note that in either the baseline or PCM versions of the model (Tables 2 and 3), cash-
°ow, ¯xed investment are nearly collinear. Second, neither version is consistent with procyclical
inventory investment as the correlations show. Third, they highlight the di±culties in correctly
interpreting investment|cash °ow correlations, an issue that only arises in the case of ¯xed invest-
ment. Table 4 reports correlations obtained from a simulation of the PCM version of the model,
with only the irreversibility constraint active. Table 4 veri¯es the analysis based on the impulse
response functions. It shows that a strong positive correlation between ¯xed investment and cash
°ow does not necessarily re°ect ¯nancing constraints. Note however that the correlation of inven-
tory investment with cash °ow is weakly negative which implies that inventory investment does not
su®er from this problem. The reason can be most easily be explained with reference to Figure 5.
The ¯rm is attempting to reduce the capital stock in line with the lower productivity but is limited
by the fact that it gets penalized as it reduces investment. Because capital is ine±ciently high for
this level of productivity, investment will remain below normal (relative to the steady state) for
many periods. Since cash-°ow and productivity shocks are highly positively correlated, cash °ow
will also be reverting slowly back to the steady state. As a result ¯xed investment and cash °ow
will be highly correlated. Materials deliveries on the other hand will immediately adjust in line
with productivity and hence inventory investment will be below steady state only at the time of
the shock. Thus, inventory investment will actually be falling when cash °ow is rising.
Gomez (2001) makes a related point in a model of ¯xed investment with costly external ¯nance.
He emphasizes that reduced-form investment equations are likely to be mis-speci¯ed because the
¯rm's optimal investment policy function is highly non-linear and cash °ow could be found to be
important because (un-related to ¯nancing constraints) it can improve the quality of the linear
approximation. In practice, researchers investigate the e®ect of cash °ow after controlling for
Tobin's q. If Tobin's q was measured without error then the addition of cash °ow should not add
any explanatory power, as according to Gomez (2001) theoretical simulations, the e®ect of ¯nancing
constraints should be already included in the market value of the ¯rm. Moreover because q and
cash-°ow are likely to be collinear, in the most relevant (empirical) scenario with measurement
19The sample under investigation is 1967Q2 to 2004Q4 due to availability of the inventory data from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis. All simulations use the same sequence of shocks by ¯xing the seed for the
random number generator.
13error a researcher may ¯nd a role for cash °ow in a reduced form regression that does not re°ect
¯nancing constraints. In essence, Gomez's result is driven by the high correlations between cash-
°ow, investment, productivity shocks, and Tobin's q, just as in this model.
Finally, Table 5 reports the cross-correlations among the same set of variables when ¯nancing
is very expensive.20 Clearly, in this case, a reduced form ¯xed investment regression is not a
de¯nitive test of the relevance of ¯nancing constraints. Notice that only when equity and debt
¯nancing become very expensive will a positive cash °ow inventory investment correlation obtain.
This implies that reduced form inventory investment, cash-°ow regressions are a better way to test
for the presence of capital market imperfections.
An important consideration is the fact that the constrained version of the model produces both
contemporaneous and dynamic correlations between inventory and ¯xed investment that are closer
to their empirical counterparts, compared to the PCM version. This is the subject of the next
section.
4.3 Timing of responses
The ¯nding that inventory investment leads ¯xed investment is an overlooked stylized fact that
has not received a proper theoretical explanation. Tables 6 and 7 present contemporaneous and
dynamic correlations of inventory investment by stage of fabrication and ¯xed investment in U.S.
manufacturing.21 Two observations are worth noting. First, the lack of comovement between
inventory and ¯xed investment contemporaneously is only a feature of input inventories. Second,
inventory investment leads ¯xed investment. The maximum cross correlation for materials (MS)
inventory investment implies a three quarter lead.
The model analyzed in this paper makes a precise prediction on the timing of the responses:
inventory investment leads ¯xed investment. In the model, the reason for this di®erence is the
presence of gestation lags, irreversibility for capital projects and the ¯nancing constraints. All
of these features are necessary to produce this timing di®erence. For ease of exposition Figure 7
replicates the investment responses of the (time-to-build) versions of the model (TTB|baseline
and tight ¯nancial constraints), along with the responses for a no-time-to-build (NTB) version of
the model following an adverse productivity shock. Note that as the line (TTB and baseline) imply,
time-to-build coupled with baseline penalties can only generate a one quarter lead. Without the
time to build element (NTB), the maximum correlation obtains contemporaneously. By contrast
20This case is de¯ned when p1 is increased to 0.067, and p3 to 0.5. The correlation signs are robust as
long as the penalty on borrowing p3 > 0:15. The remaining penalty parameters are as in baseline.
21The data on U.S. manufacturing investment are available only at an annual frequency. Quarterly esti-
mates are obtained by interpolation on the higher aggregate (non-residential private ¯xed investment) using
the Chow-Lin procedure.
14only the version of the model with tight ¯nancial constraints can replicate the three quarter lead of
materials inventory investment, by making the response of project starts hump shaped. In addition
only this version can generate a positive cash-°ow, inventory investment correlation, i.e., procyclical
inventory investment (see Table 5).
The extra kick from ¯nancing constraints can be analyzed with the aid of Figure 8. The
di®erence compared to the baseline case is evident in the behavior of debt, project starts and
deliveries and can be explained by understanding how the tighter constraints a®ect the responses.
When ¯nancing through equity is more expensive, debt (contemporaneously) declines less, since now
a given reduction in dividends is more costly and the incentive to protect dividends is stronger.22
Because of the smaller reduction in debt, expenditure on project starts and materials deliveries
declines by less contemporaneously compared to baseline. But at the same time the fact that it
is very costly to borrow (compared to baseline) in future periods23 implies that other expenditure
must protect liquidity (for dividend payments) in those future periods: since the equity constraint
is now tighter, declines in dividends are penalized more. With capital ine±ciently high for the
level of productivity, the ¯rm lets expenditure on new capital projects remain below normal for
more periods (compared to baseline) and this action economizes on liquidity for dividend payments;
moreover the response is hump-shaped, peaking a period after the shock.24 The fact that capital is
ine±ciently high (implying that money allocated to fund projects is less valuable compared to their
use for liquidity) and borrowing is less e®ective in protecting dividends, provides the incentive to
cut projects further in this period. This hump-shaped response along with the time-to-build feature
generates the hump-shape response of ¯xed investment in Figure 7.25 26 The second half of Table
7 presents the dynamic correlations calculated from the model. The model successfully replicates
the maximum dynamic correlation that implies a three quarter lead of inventory investment.
Why is this a particularly attractive explanation for rationalizing the dynamic correlations in
the data? Clearly one could argue that longer gestation lags, would predict a timing di®erence in
22Of course to a certain extent it is also due to the higher penalty attached to borrowing.
23Recall from the discussion in section 4.1.2 that the ¯rm borrows above normal in the future to boost
dividends when expenditure has resumed to normal levels, but production rate is still below the steady state
level.
24This is because ¯xed capital is slow depreciating compared to materials, hence deliveries have to revert
more quickly to normal (compared to starts) to bring the materials stock to the level implied by productivity.
In fact in simulations with a depreciation rate on capital above 10% quarterly, the response of starts becomes
monotonic.
25Note that irreversibility is crucial for generating this response: it is the fact that ¯xed capital remains
high, which makes expenditure on projects to remain persistently lower than normal.
26Also note that borrowing is not prohibitively expensive: borrowing still rises even though by much less
compared to baseline. Moreover, this is not the only (penalty) parameter perturbation that can generate
this timing pattern. Experimentation with other parameter con¯gurations (as long as p3 > 0:15) generates
this hump shaped response. These particular values were chosen because they maintain reasonable accuracy
of the solution as de¯ned in the Appendix.
15accord with the data. While this is certainly true, a PCM version with irreversibility and gestation
lags would not be consistent with the procyclicality of inventory investment, a key stylized fact of
the inventory research. Similarly, one could also argue that irreversibility on deliveries of materials
would produce the positive cash-°ow inventory investment correlation. But in such case materials
deliveries would not be as volatile compared to ¯xed investment, a ¯nding against the empirical
evidence as documented by Caggese (2007). Thus it is di±cult for a PCM version of the model to
be consistent with all the evidence.
5 Conclusions
This paper develops a rich decision theoretic model of investment in capital and inventories and
uses it to study the cyclical behavior of ¯xed and input inventory investment. An overlooked
empirical regularity is the fact that ¯xed investment lags inventory investment by a considerable
length in business cycle frequencies. This fact has not received a theoretical explanation. This
paper argues that this feature can be explained with a model that combines time-to-build for ¯xed
capital, irreversibility and ¯nancing constraints. The model replicates successfully the dynamic
empirical correlations observed in U.S. data. The appeal of this particular explanation owes to
the fact that it can also generate a set of stylized facts from the inventory research. This is
important because competitive explanations are not consistent with these facts. In particular,
without ¯nancing constraints one cannot generate the procyclicality of inventory investment. The
model's formulation nests the perfect capital markets case and by comparison with the version with
¯nancing constraints, establishes the signi¯cance of ¯nancing constraints. Interestingly, ¯nancing
constraints are not necessary to obtain procyclical materials deliveries and ¯xed investment. This
implies that attributing procyclicality to ¯nancing constraints is incorrect. In empirical work, ¯xed
investment|cash °ow sensitivities do not necessarily re°ect ¯nancing constraints.
Since the model analyzes both productivity and interest rate shocks it provides a ¯rst pass
at the quantitative importance of interest rate variation. This is important because this aids the
understanding of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy from the perspective of inventory
spending. The ¯ndings of the paper imply that interest rate changes can only generate a small
fraction of the e®ects generated from productivity disturbances.
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18A Solution
This section derives the equilibrium conditions of the model, describes the solution and de¯nes the
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Kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)Kt + s1t
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Mt+1 = (1 ¡ ±m)Mt + dt
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A brief description of the intuition behind the optimality condition for materials orders follows.
The Euler equation for materials orders describes the relevant trade-o® the ¯rm faces in adjusting
orders. The ¯rm can either order less materials today and enjoy the consumption value of higher
dividends, or keep ordering at the same rate, and use these materials in production and enjoy higher
dividends tomorrow. In response to an adverse shock today the ¯rm must at the optimum equate
the net bene¯t from reducing orders today to zero. Suppose for the moment that the constraints
do not bind so that all the pi terms vanish from the Euler equation. Then reducing orders by one
unit today has a direct dividend value of 1 unit. But this same action has to be balanced against







t+1 + (1 ¡ ±m)
¾
. Incorporating the constraint on dividends
means that there is an extra bene¯t of reducing orders today given by p1(¡ div
divt +1), i.e., the value
of moving away from the limit of the constraint. So in e®ect the total e®ect in terms of dividends
today is given by ¡1+p1(¡ div







t+1 + (1 ¡ ±m)][1 + p1( div
divt+1 ¡ 1)]
¾
. It follows that the
equity constraint makes materials orders more sensitive to the exogenous shocks of the model.
Similarly, taking into account the e®ect of the constraint on materials orders changes the trade-o®
by the fact that it becomes costly to freely reduce orders since moving closer to the respective
constraint limit is now penalized. On the other hand the future expected discounted cost is also
20a®ected since an extra unit of un-depreciated materials implies extra slack of the constraint on
orders in the future. This will have the e®ect of reducing the sensitivity of materials orders to the
exogenous shocks of the model. Similar interpretations can be given for the remaining optimality
conditions of the model.
Collecting all the equations that characterize equilibrium:
EtF(yt+2;yt+1;yt;xt+2;xt+1;xt) = 0 (A.1)
where xt denotes the vector of state variables and consists of capital, Kt, materials, Mt half-
complete projects, s1t, debt, Bt and the exogenous productivity, At, and interest rate, rt. The
vector yt consists of labor, Lt, materials orders, dt, and new projects, s2t. The solution to this
problem can be expressed as
yt = g(xt;¾)
xt+1 = h(xt;¾) + º¾"t+1
where º is a vector selecting the exogenous state variables, in this case At and rt, and ¾ = [¾A¾r]
To compute the second order approximation around (x;¾) = (x;0), one substitutes the proposed
policy rules into (A.1) and makes use of the fact that derivatives of any order of (A.1) must equal
to zero in order to compute the coe±cients of the Taylor approximations of the proposed policy
functions. The second order solution is completely characterized by the matrices that collect the
¯rst and second order derivatives of the policy functions with respect to the state variables and ¾,
gx;hx;gxx;hxx;g¾¾;h¾¾.
These are evaluated at the deterministic steady state by setting ¾ = 0. The deterministic
steady state can be completely characterized by solving the f:o:c0s setting At = At+1 = E(A) = 1
and similarly rt = rt+1 = E(r) = r. Because steady state borrowing is indeterminate at the
non-stochastic steady state, steady state borrowing is set B = 1
4BLim, in line with the empirical
evidence provided in section 3.1. Values for L;K;M can be easily derived which will be de¯ned as
non-linear expressions of the technology parameters (production and investment), discount factor,
and depreciation rates. The rest of the steady state values (states and controls) can be expressed
as functions of L;K;M.
21B Computation of penalty parameters
The computational procedure below uses the following de¯nitions for the three Euler equation
errors.27
Let D1t = ¡1 + p1(¡ div
divt + 1) + p4( d
dt ¡ 1)
S2t = ¡'2 + p1'2(¡ div
divt + 1) + p2( s2
s2t ¡ 1)
B3t = 1+p1( div
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The penalty parameters pi0s are computed according to the following procedure.
1. Guess values for fp1;:::p4g. In the initial step use fp1;:::;p4g = f0:01;0:01;0:01;0:01g.
2. Simulate the model for 100,000 periods (using the values in Table 1) and collect the min, and
max values for the state variables, (min;max)0.28
3. De¯ne a grid for the state variables, that is (min;max)1 ¶ (min;max)0, informed by the
(min;max) range from step (2) above and compute the three Euler equation errors associated with
dt;s2t;Bt+1. A 5nx size grid (nx = 6, the number of state variables) is used for the state variables
that is § 10% away from the steady state.29 For the two shocks, At, rt a range de¯ned by §3
27Note that the static labor condition is not included. The reason is that the maximum approximation
error from this equation is always less than the smallest error resulting from any the three Euler equations.
28The absolute maximum percent deviations away from the steady state is (2.78, 2.83) for s1t. For the
rest of the state variables these are within 1% of the steady state.
29Since the range obtained from step (2) does not deviate considerably away from the steady state it seems
su±cient to consider this §10%range.
22standard deviations, ¾A;¾r is used.
4. De¯ne a grid for the four penalty parameters of size np
4(where np = 5) and compute the min-
imum of the maximum Euler equation error for each point on the grid. The candidate optimal
fp1;:::;p4g are those that minimize the maximum Euler equation error.
5. Verify that the candidate optimal fp1;:::;p4g produce a (min;max) range, (min;max)2 for the
state variables that are consistent with the grid speci¯ed in step 3, i.e., (min;max)1 ¶ (min;max)2.
If yes, then these are the optimal fp1;:::;p4g. Otherwise repeat from step 2.
The Table below reports the maximum Euler equation errors calculated at the optimal values
for the penalty parameters.
The conditional expectations are computed numerically using Gauss Hermite quadrature with
11 nodes. The errors reported are in log10 units. The units chosen imply that a -1 value represents
a $1 mistake for each $10 spent, a -2 value a $1 mistake for each $100 spent, etc. The maximum
Euler equation error reported below imply roughly a 3$ mistake for each $1000 spent.
Table A1
Maximum Euler equation errors
maxflog10(EE1);log10(EE2);log10(EE3)g
baseline (½A;½r) = (0:7;0:7) (½A;½r) = (0:7;0:0) (½A;½r) = (0:0;0:7)
5% -2.55 -2.70 -3.28
10% -2.35 -2.38 -3.17
tight constraintsa (½A;½r) = (0:7;0:7) (½A;½r) = (0:7;0:0) (½A;½r) = (0:0;0:7)
5% -2.10 -2.12 -2.15
10% -2.04 -2.06 -2.11




°=0.5 º = 0.2667 ®=0.133 '1=0.5 '2=0.5
Depreciation Discount factor
±=0.025 ±m=0.5 ¯ = 1
1+r = 0:99 r=0.95
Productivity process Interest rate process
¾A=0.02 ½A = 0.7 ¾r=0.02 ½r = 0.71
Steady state debt Penalty parameters
B = 0:25[(1 ¡ ±)K + (1 ¡ ±m)M] fp1;p2;p3;p4g = f0:0067;0:1;0:0005;0:01g
23Table 2
Correlations (baseline): persistent shocks
Variable ¢Mt+1 CF At rt It
¢Mt+1 1.00 -0.047 0.41 -0.01 0.07
CF 1.00 0.88 -0.02 0.94




Correlations (PCM): persistent shocks
Variable ¢Mt+1 CF At rt It
¢Mt+1 1.00 -0.14 0.50 -0.04 0.99
CF 1.00 0.77 -0.04 -0.08




Correlations (PCM): PCM with
irreversibility constraint:
Variable ¢Mt+1 CF At rt It
¢Mt+1 1.00 -0.08 0.39 -0.01 0.05
CF 1.00 0.88 -0.02 0.94





Variable ¢Mt+1 CF At rt It
¢Mt+1 1.00 0.07 0.54 -0.02 -0.09
CF 1.00 0.82 -0.03 0.92
At 1.00 -0.02 0.72
rt 1.00 -0.03
It 1.00
bDe¯ned with p1 = 0:067, p3 = 0:5. All others as in baseline.
Table 6
Correlations (U.S.){ Cyclical component
Variable ¢MSt ¢WPt ¢FGt MIt
¢MSt 1.00 0.51 0.59 0.05
¢WPt 1.00 0.33 -0.01
¢FGt 1.00 0.19
MIt 1.00
Business cycle component calculated with Christiano-Fitzerald ¯lter.
MS-materials and supplies, WP-work-in-progress.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26Figure 1: Perfect capital markets (solid line) vs. Financial constraints (dotted line), i.i.d At









































































































































27Figure 2: Perfect capital markets (solid line) vs. Financial constraints (dotted line), i.i.d rt
shock
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28Figure 3: Perfect capital markets (solid line) vs. Financial constraints (dotted line), persis-
tent At shock































































































































































29Figure 4: Perfect capital markets (solid line) vs. Financial constraints (-.-), p2 = 0 (dotted
line), persistent At shock





























































































































































30Figure 5: Perfect capital markets with irreversibility constraint only (solid line) vs. Financial
constraints (dotted line), persistent At shock





































































































































































31Figure 6: Perfect capital markets (solid line) vs. Financial constraints (dotted line), persis-
tent rt shock



































































































































































32Figure 7: Timing of responses, persistent At shock
(response to one ¾A, log deviations from steady state)
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33Figure 8: Baseline (dotted line) vs. Expensive Borrowing (solid line), persistent At shock
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